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Abstract 
 
We analyse the effectiveness of the monetary stance adopted by the Norwegian 
central bank in implementing monetary policy assessing how it relates to the neutral 
rate of interest. The neutral rate is frequently defined as the level of real interest rate 
consistent with both stable inflation and a level of production equal to potential 
production; providing no stimulus or restraint to the economy. We attempt to 
calculate this rate and to examine the long run link between real interest rates and 
inflation in Norway. We apply cointegration analysis to explore whether the gap 
between the real and neutral rate of interest determines the growth rate of inflation in 
the long run. The prevailing real interest rate is the price that equalises saving and 
investment and this may tend to deviate from the neutral rate due to the existence of 
an output gap and inflation gap in the short run. Thus we seek to find equilibrium 
between inflation growth and the real rate gap.  Our estimate of the neutral rate lies 
in the range 2.7 to 3.2 per cent. 
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1. Introduction. 
 
The neutral real interest rate is frequently defined as the level of real interest rates 
consistent with stable inflation and a level of national production equal to potential 
national production;  providing neither stimulus nor restraint to the economy. An 
accurate measure of the neutral rate might assist central bank monetary policy. In this 
paper we attempt to calculate the neutral rate for the Norwegian economy. We assess 
the real interest rate gap and the long run relationship between this gap and inflation. 
Norway has experienced four periods of very high inflation over the past hundred years: 
during the two world wars; the Korean War and a fifteen year period from the first half 
of the 1970s to the second half of the 1980s. Norway has recently had an effective 
inflation containment policy and has adopted an inflation targeting regime. 
The paper examines whether there is a long run path set for inflation in Norway 
by an analysis of the relationship between the interest rate gap and actual inflation. We 
ignore any short run dynamics, and the influence of external shocks. We examine if the 
real interest rate gap: the difference between the real interest rate and its neutral level, 
determines the inflation growth rate by means of cointegration analysis.  
Our results suggest:  in the absence of structural breaks, a stable long-run 
equation links the growth rate of inflation to the interest rate gap; ex ante, the Norges 
Bank could make use of the neutral rate in deciding its policy accommodation; ex-post 
the neutral rate can give an indication of the current stance and objectives of monetary 
policy; finally the neutral rate for Norway appears to fluctuate between 2.5 and 3.5 
percent. 
Our paper is divided into five sections: we follow this introductory section in 
section 2 with a description of the Norwegian monetary policy regime, its evolution and 
its objectives and review the theory relating to real interest rates, the interest rate gap 
and its relationship with inflation. Section three sets out our models and hypotheses to 
be tested plus introduces our data set. In section four we present our empirical results 
and provide a general discussion and conclusion in section five. 
 
2. Norwegian Monetary policy 
 
In Norway, monetary policy is implemented by the central bank; the Norges bank, 
which conducts monetary policy by setting the interest rates on banks deposits and 
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overnight loans in the central bank and not by changing the price of liquidity supplied 
through market operations. The shortest money market rates (day-to-day money), 
indicate the price of available liquidity and will not normally fall below Norges Bank‘s 
deposit rate or exceed it’s overnight lending rate (Gjegrem, 1999).1 Hence the deposit 
rate and the overnight lending rate form a corridor for the shortest money market rates.  
The difference between these two key rates is maintained at two percentage 
points on an annual basis. Thus the sight deposit rate is the banking system’s marginal 
rate and the key policy rate in the central bank’s conduct of monetary policy. The banks 
use of an interest rate corridor is distinctive in that market operations take place at rates 
near the floor of the corridor. The effect of the asymmetrical corridor is to reduce the 
incentive to redistribute liquidity in the interbank market, because the deposit rate is 
normally so close to the market rate that banks earn little by investing surplus liquidity 
in the money market. (Kran, 2001) 
After abandoning a fixed exchange rate regime in 1992, the Norges Bank 
conducted a managed float of the Krone with no explicit stipulation of a central rate and 
fluctuation margins. The Norwegian inflation target at 2.5 percent is slightly higher than 
that in Canada (2 percent), New Zealand (between 0 and 2 percent), Sweden (2 percent) 
and the Euro area (between 1.5 and 2 percent). However it is inline with the target in the 
United Kingdom and Australia. Therefore, most of Norway’s major trading partners 
have inflation targets below 2.5 percent. According to Andreassen et al (2001), 
Norway’s higher inflation target seems to imply an expectation of a real appreciation of 
the Norwegian exchange rate through prices instead of nominal exchange rate 
adjustments.2  
The Norges Bank implements a flexible inflation target regime which gives 
weight to other macro objectives such as the output gap and unemployment3. The output 
gap is the difference between the Real GDP and Trend Real GDP. Unemployment, the 
percentage of the labour force involuntarily not employed is currently around three 
percent (Statistics Norway, 2005). It has been show by Svensson (1997) that a strategy 
consisting only targeting inflation but allowing for a gradual adjustment of observed 
                                               
1
 This is because banks can automatically borrow liquidity from Norges bank and deposit any available 
liquidity with the bank.  
2
 In comparison with other regimes, the Norwegian inflation target would appear to have half a percent 
(or somewhat above) implied real appreciation into its mandate. 
3
 A flexible inflation target is opposed to a strict inflation target which is associated with frequent and 
marked interest rate changes which keep inflation under control but could lead to wide variations in 
output and employment. 
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inflation towards its target is equivalent to a strategy in which the central bank explicitly 
targets the output gap. Norges Bank sets its interest rate instrument with a view of 
achieving the inflation target over a two year horizon, and will normally tolerate 
deviations of actual inflation from the target not exceeding one percentage point. This 
means that interest rates are set with a view of achieving an inflation rate of 2.5 percent 
two years ahead.  
Svensson (2002) describes three channels in which interest rates affect inflation 
and the level of economic activity in Norway. Higher interest rates make it more 
attractive to take Krone positions and borrow in foreign currency. As a result, higher 
interest rates normally lead to appreciation of the Krone and this leads to a reduction in 
the prices of imported goods and thus domestic inflation. Interest rates also influence 
inflation indirectly via domestic demand; the demand channel. In addition, changes in 
inflation expectations influence price and wage inflation. Enterprises do not want to 
change prices too often hence they take inflation expectation into account when they set 
wages; the expectations channel. If market participants are forward looking they will 
normally set interest rates on money market securities factoring in their expectations of 
future movements in Norges Bank’s key rates.  
 
2.2 Interest Rates 
 
2.2.1 The Neutral Rate 
 
The neutral real interest rate is frequently defined as the level of real interest rate 
consistent with stable inflation and production equal to potential production; providing 
no stimulus or restraint to the economy.4 Given the assumption that other variables like 
the real exchange rate neither stimulate nor contract the economy; the neutral rate 
should be an effective benchmark for evaluating monetary policy. According to the 
Taylor rule, when the output gap is equal to zero and inflation is on target, the nominal 
interest rate should be set equal to the neutral rate (equivalent to real interest rate) plus 
inflation expectations, the latter equal to the inflation target (hence the Taylor Rule is 
reduced to The fisher Equation)5 By setting its target short term nominal interest rate 
                                               
4
 Amoto  (2005) adds that it is generally assumed that the central banks inflation target is zero. 
5
 The Fisher equation equates the nominal interest rate to the real interest rate plus expected inflation,  
that is ( rn = rr + ) 
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equal to the neutral rate plus a (low positive or zero) target rate of inflation, a central 
bank is essentially trying to mimic the ideal conditions of an economy without nominal 
rigidities. 
The real interest rate gap (the difference between the real interest rate and its 
neutral level ( )∗− rr  provides a measure of monetary policy stance.6 The Norges Bank 
should set the real interest rate above the neutral rate in cyclical upturns; hence the real 
interest rate gap should be positive and similarly in recessions the real interest rate gap 
should be negative. The neutral rate is difficult to estimate and may change over time. 
Giammarioli and Valla (2004) provide a survey of the different estimation methods 
including: a simple average of historic interest rate series, stochastic dynamic general 
equilibrium models, or applications of the Kalman filter method. 
The determinants of the neutral rate are mainly structural conditions in the 
economy and include: the marginal product of capital, the productivity growth rate7 the 
subjective discount rate of private agents, households’ saving and consumption 
preferences over time8, the size of public debt9, the risk premium linked to uncertainty 
surrounding future inflation and exchange rates10 and liquidity of the financial 
markets11. Bernhardson (2005) argues that some of these traditional closed economy 
determinants could be less relevant for some small economies. Amoto (2005) highlights 
three issues of practical significance: nominal wage stickiness, nominal rigidities and 
financial imperfections. These factors imply there might not be a clean link between the 
real rate gap and funding costs of households and firms to undertake investment. In light 
of nominal wage stickiness, Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000) show it is desirable for 
monetary authorities to respond to both price inflation and wage inflation.  
                                               
6where r represents the real interest rate and ∗r represents the neutral rate of interest 
7
 Higher productivity growth increases demand for investments and funding. In order to raise additional 
savings to supply loans, savers must be offered more real return; hence the real interest rate must increase. 
8
 If household would like to consume less now and save more for the retirement period, they would have 
to accept a lower real return as lower funding costs would be the only way through which investors would 
be willing to increase investment. 
9
 The government may need to offer a higher return to entice savings from the private sector to fund its 
borrowing. However if the private sector decides to save more today to offset a likely increase in taxes in 
the future, the public deficit may be financed without an increase in real interest rates 
10
 The more uncertain future inflation is, the more uncertain the ex post real return. To compensate for 
this inflation risk, savers may demand an additional expected return to be willing to postpone 
consumption. Hence the higher the inflation risk, the higher the neutral real interest rate. 
11
 The less liquid the bonds market, the higher the probability that savers will influence the price if they 
desire to sell their bonds prior to redemption. To offset this potential loss, investors may demand an 
additional expected real return. 
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The neutral rate is both a short term and long term concept. In the long run when 
the inflation gap and output gap are zero, the real interest rate will be equal to the 
neutral level. In the short run, the real interest rate will deviate from the neutral real 
interest rate to the extent that the inflation gap and output gap deviate from zero. Hence 
the real interest rate gap depends on the state of the business cycle that is, the size of the 
inflation gap and the output gap. Thus we will proceed to examine the long run 
relationship between the interest rate gap and inflation. 
 
2.2.2 Nominal and Real Interest Rates 
 
The real interest rate can be regarded as the price equalising saving and investment. 
Investment, or demand for funding, increases with a lower real rate, while saving, the 
supply of loans, increases with the price. Saving and investment conditions and hence 
the real interest rate are determined by both structural factors and monetary policy. 
Assuming monetary policy is neutral, we are left with only structural factors 
determining the real interest rate. Basically all structural changes which tend to increase 
investment or reduce saving, lead to higher real interest rates and vice versa. 
Over the years both inflation and real interest rates have declined. Moreover, 
low and stable inflation is in itself an important contribution to the fall in real rates as 
the inflation risk premium declines. The inflation risk premium compensates investors 
for the risk that ex post real return may undershoot the ex ante expected one. If we focus 
on the last 25 years, the period from the 1980s is naturally divided into two sub-periods: 
a period of fighting inflation (the 1980s up to the mid 1990s) and a period of low and 
stable inflation (from the mid 1990s). In the former period, governments, including the 
Norwegian government, tightened monetary policy to fight inflation and it fell to 
relatively low levels, then nominal rates continued to decline, leading to lower real rates 
compared to the 1980s (Bernhardsen, 2005). Low and stable inflation expectations 
would reduce the inflation risk premium and therefore ex ante real returns.12 In Norway, 
real rates in the seventies were virtually zero, as high nominal rates just compensated 
for inflation. Subsequently, inflation fell gradually and stabilised at a relatively low 
level of 2.5 percent in the early nineties.  
                                               
12
 Nominal rates can be decomposed into three factors (1) an expected real return (or the expected real 
return required by investors), (2) a compensation for expected inflation, (3) an inflation risk premium due 
to that future inflation and hence real return are uncertain 
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Bernhardsen, (2005) defines the real rate in light of risk adjusted real interest 
rate parity, where the domestic real interest rate is equal to the foreign real interest rate 
plus expected changes of real exchange rate plus a risk premium, 
( ) rpqqrr eg +−+=  
where r is the domestic real interest rate, gr  is the foreign- or global real interest rate, 
eq is the log of expected long term real exchange rate (the equilibrium real exchange 
rate), q is the log of the real exchange rate and rp  is a risk premium. The expected 
change in the exchange rate is expressed by ( )qq e − . 13 If expected domestic real return 
deviates sufficiently from expected real return globally, capital movements would arise 
and equalise expected real return home and abroad. A risk premium arises due to 
uncertain exchange rates and price developments which make ex post real return 
uncertain at the time of investment. In the long run, where the economy has settled with 
inflation on target and the output gap equal to zero, it is reasonable to assume the 
exchange rate equals its long run value. Expected changes of the real exchange rate will 
be zero and the risk adjusted real interest parity is reduced to, 
rprr g +=  
i.e., the domestic real interest rate is equal to the global real interest rate plus a risk 
premium. Moreover in the long run the real interest rate will equal the neutral 
rate )( ∗= rr . Assuming similar long run conditions globally ( )∗= gg rr , it follows that, 
rprr g +=
∗∗
 
i.e., domestic neutral rate is equal to the global neutral real rate plus a risk premium. 
Hence the domestic neutral rate is determined by global structural factors plus country 
specific structural factors, the latter determining the risk premium. 
Neiss and Nelson (2001) suggest the behaviour of the real interest rate is a 
reasonable approximation for the behaviour of the real interest rate gap, a finding 
supported by King and Watson (1996). Neiss and Nelson (2001) conclude that the 
variation in the real interest rate gap is dominated by variation in the observable 
component of the gap, the real interest rate, rather than the unobservable neutral rate 
                                               
13
 Real interest parity is a real term extension of uncovered interest rate parity, the latter saying that 
nominal interest rate differentials compensate for expected nominal exchange rate changes. 
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component.14 We proxy the changes in the interest rate gap with changes in the real 
interest rate in our empirical analysis.  
 
2.2.3 Real interest rates and inflation 
 
Wicksell (1898, 1901) was one of the first to describe the relationship between real 
interest rates and inflation.  He envisaged the real rate gaps as causing secular changes 
in the price level. His cumulative process theory suggests changes in the price level are 
caused by non-zero real rate gaps similar to current New Keynesian models.  Wicksell 
(1898, 1901) argued that if the loan and deposit rates set by banks were below the 
neutral rate, there would be excess demand for funds by firms to finance investment 
projects. Consequently the creation of liquidity by banks to absorb excess demand in the 
market for loadable funds would ultimately create excess money balances in the holding 
of households. This puts upward pressure on prices and this general price inflation 
ceases when, and only when, the market is brought into equality with the neutral rate. 
Basically, to re-establish reserves at the required rates, banks increase deposit rates to 
attract savings and, consequently, raise loan rates as well to maintain margins. 
Amoto (2005) suggests that while banks play a crucial role in the Wicksell 
framework, one could suppose that it was the central bank that is determining the 
market rate of interest by injecting and withdrawing liquidity to manipulate the rates 
offered by central banks. However, because Norway’s central bank does not conduct 
monetary policy in this manner, this could be less evident.15  
Humphrey (1992) notes that Wicksell suggested the central bank could follow 
one of two different rules to contain the cumulative process. The first has the bank 
changing interest rates in response to inflation rising above or below (zero) target level 
(inflation rule). The second requires the central bank to change interest rates in response 
to deviations of the price level from a (constant) target path (“price-level rule). In 1995, 
Fuher and Moore (1995) argued that monetary policy makers had been roughly 
following Wicksell’s inflation rule for some time. Woodford (1999, 2000), revived the 
Wicksellian idea of the inflationary processes as being determined by the gap between 
                                               
14
 By contrast Neiss and Nelson (2001) find that the level of output is not a good indication of the 
behaviour of the output gap. The two series have an inverse relationship, with correlations ranging from -
0.06 to -0.68, and the output gap has a standard deviation that is less than half that of output.  
15
 As mentioned earlier the Norges Bank uses the Deposit rate as its policy rate 
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the real and neutral rates of interest.16 Neiss and Nelson (2001) use a stochastic general 
equilibrium model to examine the properties of the interest rate gap as an inflation 
indicator. Humphrey (1997) suggests that the cumulative process put forward by 
Wicksell (1901) is squarely in the tradition of the quantity theory of money by saying 
the cumulative process was “nothing less than a full-scale extension of the [quantity] 
theory to account for bank deposits on the price level”. Prices rise due to the increase in 
money supply, which come about from loan-led deposit creation by banks to finance 
excess desired investment. Humphrey (1997) further suggests that even though it is the 
real rate gap that gets the ‘ball rolling’, price increases do not occur and would not 
occur without the expansion of deposits by banks. The pivot in the system is stable real 
money demand. As soon as the money supply changes, households attempt to change 
their cash holdings; price movements occur entirely through real balance effects. 
In New Keynesian models, as well as in earlier neutral rate theories, price level 
changes are directly associated with the presence of positive or negative real rate gaps. 
This has lead to suggestions that inflation itself could serve as a good proxy variable for 
the real rate gap. (Amoto, 2005). Thus we shall now proceed to present our models 
which will test whether or not the growth rate of inflation is cointegrated with real 
interest rate gaps.  
 
3. Theory, Data, Models and Hypotheses 
 
3.1 Theory 
 
In line with Brozoza-Brzezina (2001), we adopt a model that relates the interest rate gap 
to the inflation growth rate. Our model postulates that the gap between the real and 
neutral rates of interest after all lags have worked themselves out, determines the 
change in the growth rate of inflation rate.17 The long run relationship can be described 
by the following equation: 
( )1    ( )1−∗ −=∆ tt rrψpi  
                                               
16
 Woodford suggests that this neo-Wicksellian analysis of price level determination also avoids the 
cumbersome task of estimating the implied money supply function 
17
 This kind of relationship has been advocated among others by Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Henckel, Ize 
and Kovanen (1999) aswell as Andres, Mestre and Valles (1997). 
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where pi is the inflation rate, tr , is the real rate of interest, 
∗
r  , is the neutral rate of 
interest. 18 The properties of this model can be summarized in the following table: 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
According to the model, when the interest rate gap is closed, inflation growth is 
zero and inflation is stable. Loose monetary policy ( )rr >∗  will start the process of 
inflation acceleration, whilst restrictive monetary policy ( )rr <∗  will reduce inflation. 
Brozoza-Brzezina (2001) suggests that under this model, expectations are the (implicit) 
driving force behind inflation persistence. If the neutral rate is quite stable as has been 
postulated by Neiss and Nelson (2001), permanently higher rates of inflation are related 
to permanently lower real rates of interest. 
To allow us to describe the long run equilibrium through cointegration analysis, 
some transformations have to be performed to our model. As the interest rate gap is 
expected to be stationary19, equation (1) has to be transformed one level of integration 
“upwards”, to allow for order (one) integration of the variables. Equation (1) has been 
postulated for a stationary economy, with a constant level of potential output. Normally 
permanent growth of potential output will (ceteris paribus) lower the general price level. 
This fact is for example incorporated into the QTM equation through the presence of 
income ( )Y . Hence, like Brzoza-Brzezina (2001), our model has to be enlarged by the 
potential output growth impact on prices. In our estimation income is proxied by the 
level of industrial production ( )IP 20expanding our model to the following equation: 
( )2    
−
=
∗∆−+=
1
0
t
i
tiot IPrψpipi  
where, tpi is the inflation rate, opi is the time zero inflation rate, 
*
tIP∆ is the change in 
income and 
−
=
1
0
t
i
irψ is the matrix summing all previous real interest rates. 
 
                                               
18
 Neiss and Nelson (2001) present a different equation ( ),1 ttt rr −+= ∗− ψαpipi  10 << α but this 
yields the same steady state properties 
19
 Brozoza-Brzezina attributes the main reason for this as arbitrage between investment in financial 
instruments (return r) and physical capital (return ( ) ∗= rkf ' ) 
20
 For simplicity we ignore the relationship between potential output (especially between the productivity 
growth rate) and the neutral rate of interest. 
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In line with Nelson and Neiss (2001), we also make another important 
assumption before empirically estimating the equation. As the neutral rate of interest is 
not observable, we will assume it is a stationary variable and its variance is small as 
related to the variance of the real interest rate. This allows us to keep ∗r  constant which 
yields the equation: 
( )3    
−
=
∗∗ ∆−−⋅+=
1
0
t
i
tiot IPrr ψψpipi  
where, tpi is the inflation rate, opi is the time zero inflation rate, 
*
tIP∆ is the change in 
income, *r  is the constant neutral rate and 
−
=
1
0
t
i
irψ is the matrix summing all previous 
real interet rates. 
Thus equation ( )3  implies that the growth in the general price level will depend 
on the whole history of interest rate gaps. This equation will be subjected to 
cointegration analysis in subsequent chapters. 
 
3.2 Data 
 
The raw data collected for analysis is summarised in the following table: 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
The data above needed to be transformed before we could apply it in our models. The 
adjusted data is summarised in the table below: 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
The data series run between September 1886 and September 2005. Over this 
data period they were two significant policy changes which could potentially reflect 
structural breaks in our analysis. A structural break may have occurred at the end of 
1992 when the fixed exchange rate regime was abolished. The second could have 
occurred in March 2001 when Inflation targeting was adopted. To verify if these policy 
breaks do indeed translate into structural breaks, exogenous “tests” shall be conducted 
in the next section. 
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4 Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Structural breaks 
 
In our study we will use exogenous approximation via observation of the behaviour of 
the stochastic series in our model. The logarithms of the series over the period 01/1986 
to 08/2005 are plotted and presented in appendix 1. It appears like a break occurs 
around the time the fixed exchange rate regime was abolished in the early nineties. 
Several methodologies have been suggested that allow for the determination of the date 
of the structural break endogenously including Zivot and Andrews 21(1992), Banerjee, 
Lumsdaine and Stock (1992) and Perron (1990).  However Perron (1989) conducts all 
his unit root tests using only a one time predetermined change. He argues that if the 
break date is known, like the Great Crash of 1929 or the oil price shock of 1973, then 
models with exogenous breaks are appropriate.  The evidence from our graphs allow us 
to conclude that a structural break occurs at the end of 1992 when the fixed exchange 
rate system was abolished. Therefore, the subsequent cointegration tests will be 
estimated over two windows: a long sample (09/1986-08/2005) and a short sample 
(1/1993 -08/2005). Prior to our cointegration analysis we shall test the variables for 
their level of integration via Augmented Dicky Fuller tests (ADF). 
 
4.2 Tests for level of Integration 
 
The integration properties of inflation and interest rates are tested using ADF tests, 
reported below: 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
From the table above it is evident that the hypothesis of a unit root can not be 
rejected for most of variables with or without a trend. Save for only CPI and LRFYBY 
with trend, the hypothesis of a unit root is not rejected. The uncertainty in the actual 
integration of the price level is disappointing as knowing with certainty the integration 
level of prices would allow us check for conformity with our model. For our model to 
                                               
21
 Zivot and Andrews (1992) present a procedure whereby a test statistic is estimated for each period 
while, simultaneously, allowing for the possibility of a structural break. The most negative value is 
compared with the critical values and is assumed as the date of the structural break. 
 14 
be consistent with the data set, Inflation needs to be an I (1) variable, and its growth rate 
stationary. Brzoza-Brzezina (2001) notes that the CPI is an imperfect approximation of 
the general price level and so ambiguity should rather be explained as a result of 
imperfection of the indices or low power of the integration tests. 
The appearance of LRFYBY as a stationary variable is not abnormal as interest 
rates do tend to exhibit mean reversion. Furthermore economic theory predicts the 
interest rate gap to be a stationary variable. To check if any of the variables are I (2), we 
created their first –differences and applied the ADF command. In all cases we find that 
the hypothesis that the first differences of these variables have a unit root is strongly 
rejected. Hence we can conclude that LCPI, LRDR and LIP could be I (1) variables.  
 
4.3  Results of Cointegration tests 
 
To test for cointegration we will make use of a Vector Error Correction Model build on 
three variables, the price level ( )CPI , the sum of all previous real interest rates 






−
=
1
0
t
i
ir  
and potential 0utput ( )IP . Johansen tests are adopted in our estimation of the 
cointegrating relationships.  
The equation for our VAR estimation is: 
tytyityyoyt uwztaay +Ψ+Π−+=∆ −1  
where, 





=
t
t
t
x
y
z , ty is an 1×ym vector of jointly determined (or endogenous) ( )1I  
variables, tx  is an 1×ym vector of  ( )1I  exogenous variables, tw is a 1×q  vector ( )0I  
exogenous variables, and tyu  is the error term. 
Results of the lag order of the VAR based on this estimation are presented in the 
table below: 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
At this stage the cointegrating relationship of equation ( )3  will be found. This 
means finding the vector [ ]1,,1 ψ  with a constant such that the residuals ε  from equation 
( )3  are stationary. The econometric model that underlies the cointegrating VAR using 
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the Johansen maximum likelihood approach is given by the following general vector 
error correction model (VECM): 
tptptttt xxxxx εpipipipipi +∆++∆+∆++=∆ −−−− ...221110  
where 0pi is an ( )1×n  vector of intercept terms iopi , ipi  are ( )nn ×  coefficient matrices 
with elements ( )ijkpi , pi  is a matrix with elements jkpi  such that one or more of the 
0≠jkpi , and tε  is an ( )1×n  vector with elements itε . 
If all the variables in tx  above are ( )1I , the error correction representation of 
these variables is necessarily a stationary linear combination giving rise to: 
ttitt xxx εpipi −∆−−∆=∆ −−  101  
where 0pi is an ( )1×n  vector of intercept terms iopi , ipi  are ( )nn ×  coefficient matrices 
with elements ( )ijkpi , pi  is a matrix with elements jkpi  such that one or more of the 
0≠jkpi , and tε  is an ( )1×n  vector with elements itε . Incorporating this general 
equation above to equation ( )3  gives rise to equation ( )4  below: 
( )4    
−
=
∗ +∆−−⋅+=
1
0
*
t
i
ttio yrr εψψpipi  
where, tpi is the inflation rate, opi is the time zero inflation rate, 
*
tIP∆ is the change in 
income, *r  is the constant neutral rate and 
−
=
1
0
t
i
irψ is the matrix summing all previous 
real interest rates and tε  is the error term. 
From this equation, 4 different models will be tested based on: 
• 1 price index; 2 data samples; 2 interest rates 
Model 1: IR, RDR, IP   -1993M1 - 2005M8 
Model 2: IR, LRFYB, IP  -1986M1 - 2005M8 
Model 3: IR, LRFYBY, IP  -1986M1- 1992M12 
Model 4: IR, LRFYBY, IP -1993M1- 2005 M 
 
The results of the Johansen test for cointegration applied to these four different models 
are presented below:  
Insert Table 6 about here 
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• For model 1 the trace statistics do not reject the hypothesis Ho =1 at a 90 percent 
significance level whilst the eigenvalue statistics do not reject this hypothesis at 
a 95 percent level. Thus both statistics seem to imply the existence of one 
cointegrating relationship (vector) between the variables. 
• For model 2 the trace statistics do not reject the hypothesis of Ho = 2 at a 95 
percent level whist the eigenvalue statistics do not reject the hypothesis that Ho 
= 1 at 90 percent significance level. The eigenvalue statistics also imply the 
existence of two cointegrating relationships at a 95 percent significant level. 
Thus both statistics seem to imply the existence of two cointegrating 
relationships (vectors). 
• For model 3 both the trace statistic and the eigenvalue statistics do not reject the 
hypothesis of Ho = 2 at a 95 percent significance level. Hence the bias is 
towards the existence of two cointegrating relationships (vector). 
• For model 4 the trace statistic do not reject both the hypothesis Ho = 1 and Ho = 
2 at a 95 percent significance level. The eigenvalue statistics do not reject the 
hypothesis of Ho = 1 at a 95 percent significance level. Hence the bias is 
towards the existence of one cointegrating relationship (vector). 
 
Next we estimate the cointegrating relationships having assumed the existence 
of one cointegrating vector in each model as suggested by most of the models and 
complimented by theory. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
As can be seen from the table, three out of the four relationships fulfil the 
criterion on coefficient signs. In the case of model two the interest rate and the 
industrial production coefficients are negative which implies a positive relationship 
between these variables and inflation, and thus contradicting the theoretical model. To 
this end no further analysis of model was carried out as this would be purposeless. This 
model seems to fail because of the existence of a structural break over the long period 
estimation.  As noted in the preceding chapter a structural break seems to have occurred 
when Norway shifted from a fixed exchange rate regime to a floating currency at the 
end of 1992. 
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In the case of the other three models the signs on the industrial production 
coefficient and interest rate coefficient are positive. This implies a negative relationship 
between real rates and inflation and thus conforms to the theoretical model. Thus the 
error correction coefficients were estimated and in all three cases the standard errors 
were significantly different from zero. The error correction adjustment coefficients 
suggest causality is compliant with theory as the only significant error correction 
mechanism is obtained in the inflation equation. This implies a causal relationship of 
the type we would have expected, going from real interest rates to inflation. 
 
The error correction equations are given below: 
Model 1 
ecm1 =    1.0000*IR +0 .1037159*RDR +   0.69986*IP -0.0031205 
 
Model 3 
ecm1 =    1.0000*IR +   0.17824*RFYBY + 0.6878E-3*IP  -0.076100 
 
Model 4 
ecm1 =    1.0000*IR +   .18563*RFYBY + .1322E-5*IP -.0018857 
 
Whether the real interest rate gap should lead or lag inflation depends upon how 
forward looking private sector agents are in their decision making. If current spending 
decisions are largely based on expectations of future interest rates (approximately, long-
term interest rates), and firms’ pricing decisions are largely based on their expectations 
of future excess demand, inflation should be negatively correlated with cumulated 
future real rate gaps. Conversely if private sector is mostly backward looking, or it is 
tightly constrained by past outcomes, then current inflation should be negatively 
correlated with past real rate gaps.  
Our empirical results suggest that investors are both forward looking and 
backward looking as significant cointegrating relationships exist with both past gaps 
(based on the real deposit rate) and future rate gaps (based on five year bond yields). 
Finally we restrict the parameter IP  to 1 (as in the theoretical model) and the 
validity of this restriction will be tested based on likelihood ratio statistics. The results 
are given in the table below. 
Insert Table 8 about here 
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From the table above it can be seen that the IP parameter does not significantly differ 
from one only in the case of model 1. Since the p-values for this model is greater than 5 
percent, we can not reject the null hypothesis that the data is consistent with the theory. 
However in the case of the other two models, model 3 and model 4, the IP parameter is 
significantly different from one which implies that the data is not supporting the 
theoretical model. 
Summing up the results it can be concluded that only one out of the four models 
evaluated had a cointegrating relationship that fulfilled all the criteria imposed on the 
model. 
 
4.2 Neutral Rate Comparison 
 
If the neutral rate could be assumed to be constant over time, the real interest rate 
averaged over the whole business cycle, should approximate the neutral real interest rate 
because the positive and negative real interest rate gaps cancel out.22 Our estimation 
was based on looking at implied long term forward nominal rate given by RFYBY and 
the current rate proxied by RDR. Both series were deflated by the CPI inflation rate. In 
principle, the long term implied forward rates are determined by the market’s future 
interest rate expectations and should, at least in theory, be independent of the current 
business cycle. Hence the real rate deduced from them should be close to the markets 
estimate of the real interest rate. From the real rates we computed the average which 
provided our estimates of the neutral rate. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
Our estimates of the neutral rate based on the different model dates are not very reliable 
as the dates cross over different business cycles. In addition the results are skewed by 
the periods of high inflation before the turn of the century. To get a more accurate rate 
we proceed to estimate the neutral rate using data about real rates after the turn of the 
century. Our estimate lies in the range between  2.7 and 3.2 percent; consistent with 
estimates of the global neutral rate.  
                                               
22
 The problems related with this approach according to (Bernhardsen, 2005) are: inflation expectations 
and hence real interest rates are unobservable, it is not always clear when the business cycle starts and 
ends, and the neutral real interest s by nature not constant. 
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Giammarioli and Valla (2003), argue that the neutral rate for the Euro area has 
gradually declined from around 4 in the mid-1990s to around 3 percent in 2000. 
Cuaresma, Gnan and Ritzberger-Gruenwald (2003) suggest the neutral rate had settled 
to a level of about 2 percent at the end of 2002. Garnier and Wilhelmsen (2004) also 
find a drop in the neutral rate for both the Euro area and Germany. More recently 
Goldman Sachs (2005) estimates the level of the neutral rate to be close to 2 percent in 
October 2004. They further report that this rate has decreased over the past 15 years. 
Laubach and Williams (2003) estimated the US neutral rate to be about 3 
percent in 2001. The OECD (2004) argues that the neutral real interest rate in the US 
has varied between 2 and 5 percent since the 1960s and that it may now be slightly 
higher than 2 percent. Its temporary rise in the latter half of the 1990s is attributed to 
higher productivity growth. In the wake of the collapse of equity prices and the 
recession after the turn of the millennium, the estimates for the neutral real interest rate 
in the US have been lowered. Manrique and Marques (2004) also identify a similar 
pattern to Laubach and Williams (2005) that the neutral rate of interest in the US 
increased towards the millennium but then declined thereafter. The Financial Times 
(2005) puts the neutral real rate in the US around 2.75 percent, while Goldman Sachs 
(2005) puts it around 2.5 percent.  
Hammerstrøm and Lønning (2000) suggest a neutral real interest rate in the 
range of 3-4 percent for Norway. The Norges Bank (2005) believes a more reasonable 
range for the neutral real interest rate is between 2.5-3.5 percent. Bernhardsen (2005) 
using implied long-term forward interest rates, concludes the real neutral interest rate 
varied between 3 and 4 percent in the period 1998-2003. However, from mid-2002 it 
has been trending downwards.  This estimated interval for Norway is somewhat higher 
than the estimate for the global neutral real interest rate, implying a risk premium of 
about half a percent. Norges Bank (2005) attributes this difference to specific conditions 
such as exchange rate and liquidity risk in addition to large international investors’ 
preference for avoiding small markets.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The objective of our research was to test the validity of the Wicksellian theory in the 
context of Norway and simultaneously calculate the neutral rate of interest. The results 
of our empirical analysis supported this relationship in one out of the four models 
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estimated. Model 2 most likely failed because of the existence of a structural break over 
the estimation window. Models 3 and 4, although posting significant error correction 
equations, failed because the restrictions placed on the IP parameter (as with the 
theoretical model where y* is set to one) were not significant. Thus only one out of the 
four models evaluated had a cointegrating relationship that fulfilled all the criteria 
imposed on the model. Therefore from this significant result we can conclude that, with 
respect to the inflationary process, that the economy can work like a space shuttle, 
which once accelerated will cruise at a certain speed without the use of engines. The 
central bank can open the interest rate gap to accelerate/decelerate inflation and once 
this has happened, the gap can be closed and inflation will remain at the higher/lower 
level. 
The second objective was to derive and compare the neutral rate. The adopted 
research method only allowed us to calculate the average level of the neutral rate and 
not the time series variations. Further research in this area could be explored through 
use of general equilibrium models or Kalman filter tests. 
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Table 1: Properties of Model 
The Model ( )1−∗ −=∆ tt rrψpi  
 
Closed Interest Rate Gap Impact on Inflation & its growth rate 
 ?=P  
∗
= rr  .const=pi  
 0=∆pi  
 
Positive Interest rate Gap Impact on inflation & its growth rate 
 ?=P  
∗> rr  ↓pi  
 0<∆pi  
 
Negative Interest Rate gap Impact inflation & its growth rate 
 ?=P  
∗< rr  ↑pi  
 0>∆pi  
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Table 2. Raw Data used for Norwegian analysis 
Variable Description 
CPI Consumer Price Index23 
DR Deposit Rate 
FYBY Yield on 5 Year Bonds 
IR Inflation rate24 
PI Production index25 
Notes: All the data were collected from the Primarc Thomson Data stream database 
with the exception of the industrial production index which was sourced from the 
Statistics Norway database.  
 
                                               
23
 The CPI is the seasonally adjusted series. 
24
 The inflation rate was derived from the CPI series as the periodic growth between the series. It was 
used to proxy expected inflation 
25
 The industrial production index measures seasonally adjusted index of oil and gas extraction, 
manufacturing, mining and quarrying and electricity, gas and steam supply. As these outputs would 
represent a large proportion of GDP, this index was used as a proxy for GDP. 
 25 
 
Table 3. Raw Data Transformation for estimation purposes 
Variable Transformation 
LCPI ( )CPIln  
RDR ( ) 1)1/(1 −++ IRDR  
RFYBY ( ) ( ) 11/1 −++ IRYFYB  
LPI ( )PIln  
D (LCPI) ( )1−− LCPILCPI  
LRDR ln )(RDR  
D (LRDR) ( )1−− LRDRLRDR  
LRFYBY ln ( )RFYBY  
D (LRFYB) ln )1(−− LRFYBYLRFYBY  
Notes: Transformation of the data, together with subsequent testing was carried out in 
Pesaran and Pesaran’s Microfit 4 software. Real interest rates were calculated by 
discounting the nominal rates with their respective inflation rates. 
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Table 4: Results of ADF Unit Root Tests 
Variable Lag 
Order in 
ADF 
Test 
ADF 
Statistic 
without 
trend 
Test 
Statistic 
Lag 
Order 
in ADF 
Test 
ADF 
Statistic 
with     
trend 
Test 
Statistic 
LCPI 
D(LCPI) 
7 
0 
-2.8745 
-2.8746 
-2.7382 
-10.5105                
1 
0
 -3.4311 
-3.4312 
-3.9675*  
-11.2206              
LRDR 
D(LRD) 
4 
5 
-2.8822 
-2.8824 
-1.4252  
-8.3133       
6 
5 
-3.4426 
-3.4428 
-1.6249 
-8.3451        
LRFYBY 
D(LRFYBY) 
6 
7 
-2.8745 
-2.8746 
-1.4976 
-9.3164      
6 
7 
-3.4311 
-3.4312 
-3.4850*   
-9.3633         
LIP 
D(LIP) 
3 
2 
-2.8745 
-2.8745 
-1.9493      
-14.2935      
2 
2 
-3.4310 
-3.4311 
-.70623       
 -14.4903                
Notes: Lag order in the VAR model was chosen based on information criteria (Akaike 
Information Criterion, Schwarz Bayseian Criterion, Maximised log likelihood and 
Hannan –Quinn Criterion) 
* indicates null hypothesis of a unit root rejected a 95% Confidence Interval.  
 
 
 
Table 5. Results of Unrestricted VAR Estimation 
Variables in the Model Sample LL AIC SC LR Choice 
DLCP; LRDR; LIP & INPT  93M1-05M8 12 4 4 5 4 
DLCPI; LRFYBY; LIP & INPT  93M1-05M8 12 4 2 5 4 
DLCPI; LRFYBY; LIP & INPT  86M1-05M8 12 4 2 5 4 
Notes: Given the monthly frequency of our data we set the maximum lag length in our 
unrestricted VAR estimation to 12.  
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Table 6. Results of The Johansen (1988) Tests for Cointegration 
 
         Hypothesis Mode1 1 
93M1-05M8 
 
Ho 
 
H1 
Trace Test 
Statistic 
Max 
Eiegenvalue St 
IR 
 
RDR 
 
IP 
r = 0 
 
r = 1 
 
r = 2 
 
r = 1 ( r 1) 
 
r = 2 ( r2 ) 
 
r = 3 
(34.8700)                
56.8694*  
(20.1800) 
17.6324 
 (9.1600) 
2.2194    
(22.0400)                 
39.2370* 
(15.8700)                
15.4130**           
(9.1600) 
2.2194    
 
         Hypothesis Mode1 2 
86M1-05M8 
 
Ho 
 
H1 
Trace Test 
Statistic 
Max 
Eiegenvalue St 
IR 
 
RFYBR 
 
IP 
r = 0 
 
r = 1 
 
r = 2 
 
r = 1 ( r 1) 
 
r = 2 ( r2 ) 
 
r = 3 
(34.8700) 
71.7698* 
(20.1800) 
29.1312* 
(9.1600) 
8.2798**                                                                   
(22.0400) 
42.6386*            
(15.8700) 
20.8515* 
(9.1600)                      
8.2798**
 
         Hypothesis Mode1 3 
86M1-92M12 
 
Ho 
 
H1 
Trace Test 
Statistic 
Max 
Eiegenvalue St 
IR 
 
RFYBR 
 
IP 
r = 0 
 
r = 1 
 
r = 2 
 
r = 1 ( r 1) 
 
r = 2 ( r2 ) 
 
r = 3 
(34.8700) 
63.8134* 
(20.1800) 
28.1201* 
(9.1600) 
 8.4649** 
(22.0400) 
35.6933* 
(15.8700) 
18.6552* 
(9.1600) 
8.4649**                                                                                   
 
         Hypothesis Mode1 4 
93M1-05M8 
 
Ho 
 
H1 
Trace Test 
Statistic 
Max 
Eiegenvalue St 
IR 
 
RFYBR 
 
IP 
r = 0 
 
r = 1 
 
r = 2 
 
r = 1 ( r 1) 
 
r = 2 ( r2 ) 
 
r = 3 
(34.8700) 
70.1407* 
(20.1800) 
18.9666** 
(9.1600) 
 8.9421** 
(22.0400) 
51.1742* 
(15.8700) 
10.0244 
(9.1600) 
8.9421**                                                                                   
Notes: Critical values at 95% Confidence Interval in parenthesis, test statistics in 
bold.*denotes Ho rejected at 5%.26**denotes Ho rejected at 10% but accepted at 5%. 
Blank denotes Ho accepted at both 10% and 5%.  
                                               
26
 If Ho is rejected at 5% it means it will automatically be rejected at 10% because the critical values will 
be getting smaller 
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Table 7: Summary of Cointegrating Vectors of the 4 Models 
 Model 1 
IR, 
RDR,  
IP   
93M1-
05M8     
Model 2 
IR, 
RFYBY, 
IP 
86M1-
05M8 
Model3 
IR 
RFYBY 
IP 
86M1-
92M12 
Model 4 
IR, 
RFYBY,  
IP 
93M1 - 
05M8 
Inflation 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 1,0000 
Industrial Production 0.69986 -0.333 0.1782 0.1322 
Interest Rate 0.00372 -.0530 0.6878 0.1856 
Constant -0.0031 0.001 -0.761 -0.001 
Error Correction 
coefficient  
In inflation equation 
(Standard error) 
 
-0.4599 
 
(0.1261)                       
 
****** 
 
******                        
 
-0.5286 
 
(0.13224) 
 
-0.8981 
 
(0.1500)                        
Notes: ****** indicates no estimation was conducted because the industrial production 
and interest rate coefficient signs did not conform to theory 
Tests are conducted with restricted intercepts and no trends in the VAR. Restrictions 
were specified on the IR variable in each case in order to identify the long run structural 
relationships. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Results for tests of the Validity Restrictions on IP parameters 
Model Model 1 
IR, RDR,IP   
93M1-05M8  
Model 3 
IR, RFYB, IP 
86M1-92M12) 
Model 4 
IR, RFYBY, IP 
93M1-05M8 
CHSQ( 1) 3.6407 5.6314 41.2599 
P-value (0.56) (0.01)* (0.00)* 
Notes: * indicates that the IP parameter is significantly different from one at the 5 
percent level Cointegration estimation set with restricted intercepts and no trends in the 
VAR, with over-identifying linear restrictions set on the IP variable in all three 
estimations.  
 
 
Table 9. Neutral Rate Estimation 
Model Model 1 
IR ,RDR,  IP   
93M1-05M8   
Model 2 
IR, RFYB, IP 
86M1-05M8) 
Model 3 
IR, RFYB, IP 
86M1-92M12 
Model 4 
IR, RFYB, IP 
93M1-05M8 
Neutral Rate 4.1 7.4 4.5 10.1 
Notes: The estimation of the neutral rate was based on the computed average of the real 
interest rate over the respective estimation windows. 
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Log RDR 
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